J. Lawrence Broz

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Replication data for: Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
hdl:1902.1/10299 UNF:3:srp1CYsa0rWQGpLLysOZvQ==
Version: 1 – Released: Wed Nov 28 00:00:00 EST 2007
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Original Publication
Results found in this publication can be replicated using these data.
J. Lawrence Broz. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." 2002. International Organization 56, 4 (Autumn):863-889. Reprinted in Benjamin J. Cohen (ed.), International Monetary Relations in the New Economy. Edward Elgar, 2004. Translated into Spanish as “Política Legislativa de Rescates Financieros Internationales." 2004. La Gaceta de Ciencia Politíca, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 4, 1 (Summer):53-86. article available here
Data Citation Details
Study Global IDhdl:1902.1/10299
AuthorsJ. Lawrence Broz (University of California, San Diego)
Production Date2002
DistributorJ. Lawrence Broz
Distributor Contactjlbroz@ucsd.edu
Distribution Date2007
Deposit Date2007
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Abstract and Scope
Abstract

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are alternative monetary commitments that differ in transparency. While CBI is opaque and difficult to monitor, a commitment to a fixed exchange rate is easily observed. Political systems also vary in terms of transparency. I argue that the transparency of monetary commitments and the transparency of political systems are substitutes. Where political decision making is opaque (autocracies), governments must look to a commitment that is more transparent and constrained (fixed exchange rates) than the government itself. The transparency of the monetary commitment substitutes for the transparency of the political system to engender low inflation. Where the political process is transparent (democracies), a formal commitment to CBI can produce lower inflation because private agents and the political opposition are free to detect and punish government interference with the central bank. Statistical results indicate that (1) autocracies are more likely to adopt exchange-rate pegs than democracies, and (2) CBI is effective in limiting inflation in nations with high levels of political transparency.

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"Replication data for: Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes", hdl:1902.1/10299