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Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
hdl:1902.1/10124 UNF:3:UTImW6pM1r+f13kfNEYJrQ==
Version: 1 – Released: Wed Nov 28 00:00:00 EST 2007
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If you use these data, please add the following citation to your scholarly references. Why cite?
Original Publication
Results found in this publication can be replicated using these data.
McGillivray, Fiona; Stam III, Allan C. (2004) "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2, 154-172, doi:10.1177/0022002703262858: article available here
Data Citation Details
Study Global IDhdl:1902.1/10124
AuthorsFiona McGillivray (New York University); Allan C. Stam III (University of Michigan)
Production Date2004
DistributorAllan C. Stam
Distributor Contactstam@umich.edu
Distribution Date2007
Deposit DateJuly, 2007
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Abstract and Scope
Abstract

A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions; however, leadership change in nondemocratic sender and nondemocratic target states is strongly related to the ending of economic sanctions.

Keywordscoercive diplomacy; democratic leadership; nondemocratic leadership; economic sanctions; sender state; target state; policy change
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Number of Files 2
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"Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions", hdl:1902.1/10124